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TAGS: [CDG](#) [MCAP](#) [NASA](#) [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [TSPA](#) [UNPUOS](#) [UNGA](#) [RS](#)  
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN MFA WELCOMES NON-PAPER ON SATELLITE  
COLLISION BRIEFING AND SPACE TCBMS

REF: A. A) SECSTATE 54933  
[1](#)B. B) MOSCOW 556  
[1](#)C. C) STATE 28279  
[1](#)D. D) MOSCOW 435

[1](#)1. (SBU) SUMMARY: At a June 2 meeting, MFA Department for Security Affairs and Disarmament (DVBR) Expert on Military Space and ABM Systems Klapovskiy and Third Secretary Grebenshchikov were pleased by the cooperative tone of ref A non-paper and points and will inform the Embassy if the Russian delegation can get to Vienna in time for the proposed June 8 briefing. Klapovskiy asserted that the 2007 Russian submission to the UN Secretary General should be the basis to discuss bilateral transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs) relating to space activities. He carefully noted that the United States has begun a review of national space policy and does not want any linkage of TCBMs with the broader questions of the broader feasibility and desirability of bilateral and multilateral arms control measures for space. As part of the U.S. review, Klapovskiy urged a careful look at the "faulty" EU draft Code of Conduct. At the direction of Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov, Grebenshchikov on June 4 requested contact information to arrange the proposed June 8 briefing. END SUMMARY.

If not June 8 in Vienna then June 15-16 in Geneva  
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[1](#)2. (SBU) Meeting in Russian with EST Counselor on June 2, MFA Department for Security Affairs and Disarmament (DVBR) Expert on Military Space and ABM Systems Aleksandr A. Klapovskiy and Third Secretary Andrey Grebenshchikov warmly welcomed ref A non-paper and points. Klapovskiy, who works on the Conference on Disarmament (CD) issues, explained that the issue of space debris spans his department and. He promised to study the non-paper carefully and share it with his colleagues, now in the Department of New Threats and Challenges, who work on the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS). Klapovskiy was particularly pleased by both the tone of the non-paper and its emphasis that by illustrating how congested space has become, the February satellite collision can serve as an impetus to increase international cooperation and improve bilateral transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs) relating to space activities. Grebenshchikov will check and then inform the

Embassy if the Russian CO

PUOS delegation can change its travel plans to get to Vienna a day earlier for the proposed June 8 briefing by General Helms. If this is not possible, Klapovskiy proposed that that the United States and Russia should organizing a side-meeting during the UN CD conference on June 15 and 16 in Geneva. Grebenshchikov would be one of the expets attending and one of the two planned Russian presentations will be on the February satellite collision. Klapovskiy agreed to share the non-paper and his report with the MFA North America Desk, Rosatom and the Ministry of Defense.

#### Use Russian UN-proposed space TCBMs As a Basis

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13. (SBU) Klapovskiy welcomed the opportunity to resume working with the United States on TCBMs. Noting that the Counselor and non-paper had referred potential collaboration on such bilateral TCBMs as those included in Russia's submission to the report of the UN Secretary General on "Transparency and confidence-building measures in Outer space activities," dated August 3, 2007 (UNGA A/62/114), Klapovskiy handed over a copy he had marked earlier in pencil. He stated that because the Russian TCBM submission was the most complete, it should be the basis for negotiations. The Ministry of Defense (MOD) had approved the entire text and Russia remains ready to implement all of the TCBMs. Recognizing U.S. "sensitivity" to any text referring to the weaponization of space, Klapovskiy said the United State could not find objectionable either para one on TCBMs generally or para 2 on TCBMs in space. He then reviewed

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paras 6, 7 and 8, the Russian Federation's proposal to establish a group of government experts to establish TCBMs to enhance the transparency of outer space programs, expand available information on outer space programs, and establish rules of conduct for outer space activities.

14. (SBU) Klapovskiy regretted that bilateral work since 2005 on a resolution, including at two expert meetings, has not achieved anything. He was chagrined that although all other states voted for the Russian 2008 UNGA resolution on transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities (A/63/389), the United States had voted against it and Israel abstained. In light of the satellite collision, he opined that Russia and the United States, the world's two largest space powers, should work together and with the international community to take concrete steps to prevent further dangerous situations -- exchanging information both to predict when collisions will occur and to determine how to avoid them. Such collisions are dangerous and expensive. In the case of the February collision, the U.S. lost an active space device in a collision that the United States could have prevented because the U.S. satellite's engine and power source were still functioning, whereas the Russian satellite was dead. Stressing the serious nature space debris poses to human space flight, Klapovskiy cited Russian data that the International Space Station (ISS) has had to adjust its path seven times to avoid a dangerous collision with space debris.

This very serious problem, he intoned, requires serious study. Given the spirit of the U.S. non-paper, Klapovskiy hoped the United States would react positively to the new UNGA resolution on space TCBMs that the MFA is already preparing.

#### U.S. Review of Space Policy - No Linkage of TCBMs with Arms Control

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15. (SBU) Because Klapovskiy had raised the UN resolution, the CD meeting, and was so clearly pleased by the non-paper, EST Counselor deployed the contingency points. Klapovskiy listened intently, asking her to repeat them slowly and in English so that Grebenshchikov could capture them verbatim. They nodded approvingly that the Administration is commencing a review of all aspects of national space policy, including

arms control policy. Klapovskiy said he understood and would report carefully that the United States does not want bilateral discussions on pragmatic and voluntary TCBMs to be linked to broader questions of the feasibility and desirability of bilateral and multilateral arms control measures for space. Although he could not give a "one-hundred percent sure" answer, he welcomed the change in U.S. position, adding that it is important for Russia to respond in time to have an influence on the U.S.'s strategic review of space policy.

#### Look Carefully at Faulty EU Code of Conduct

16. (SBU) Klapovskiy then turned to the EU's Code of Conduct (CoC), noting that Russia and the EU had agreed that the CoC would be non-binding and voluntary, while the Russia-Chinese-proposed Prevention on the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space Treaty (PPWT) in the CD is to be legally binding in prohibiting certain types of weapons-related activities in space. In December 2008, the EU and Russia agreed that the PPWT and the CoC are first, not confrontational, second, parallel initiatives, and third, mutually reinforcing. According to Klapovskiy, Russia and the EU agreed to advance evenly the PPWT, CoC and the TCBM UN resolution. He urged that, as the United States reviews national space policy, it look very carefully at the December 2, 2008 draft CoC that the United States had supported because it is faulty in three areas:

- it unnecessarily repeats points that are in current binding space agreements, which is inappropriate for a

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nonbinding document;

- in places its text is legally binding; and
- there are unclear several formulations that can be interpreted in various ways.

Klapovskiy expected that at the June 9 UNCOPUOS, the EU would call for long-term sustainability of space operations to be added to the agenda of the scientific-technical committee. If the parties vote for this, the committee would instruct a sub-committee to work on a CoC. Klapovskiy noted that Russia is working on its own draft CoC that includes all the good parts of the EU's CoC while correcting the faulty areas. It will circulate it to relevant Russian ministries and then give it to the EU.

17. (SBU) On June 4, Grebenshchikov called to request contact information to arrange the June 8 briefing. He explained that they had briefed Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov, who had directed that the Russian Mission in Vienna send a high-ranking official to the June 8 briefing, accompanied by the appropriate experts from the Russian UNCOPUOS delegation.

(Comment: Although Klapovskiy said he would have to study the non-paper carefully, he was clearly pleased by its tone and content, and even more buoyed by the contingency points. Grebenshchikov, who had noted on the way to the meeting room how much the MFA values Klapovskiy's expertise and that he was still working with the MFA, did not hide his enthusiasm on the way out. End Comment.)

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